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Abstract—Recent years have seen extensive growth of services
enabling free broadcasts of live streams on the Web. Free live
streaming (FLIS) services attract millions of viewers and make
heavy use of deceptive advertisements. Despite the immense
popularity of these services, little is known about the parties
that facilitate it and maintain webpages to index links for free
viewership.
This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of the FLIS
ecosystem by mapping all parties involved in the anonymous
broadcast of live streams, discovering their modus operandi,
and quantifying the consequences for common Internet users
who utilize these services. We develop an infrastructure that
enables us to perform more than 850,000 visits by identifying
5,685 free live streaming domains, and analyze more than 1
Terabyte of traffic to map the parties that constitute the FLIS
ecosystem. On the one hand, our analysis reveals that users of
FLIS websites are generally exposed to deceptive advertisements,
malware, malicious browser extensions, and fraudulent scams.
On the other hand, we find that FLIS parties are often reported
for copyright violations and host their infrastructure predomi-
nantly in Europe and Belize. At the same time, we encounter
substandard advertisement set-ups by the FLIS parties, along
with potential trademark infringements through the abuse of
domain names and logos of popular TV channels.
Given the magnitude of the discovered abuse, we engineer
features that characterize FLIS pages and build a classifier to
identify FLIS pages with high accuracy and low false positives,
in an effort to help human analysts identify malicious services
and, whenever appropriate, initiate content-takedown requests.
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite the growth and popularity of the Internet in the
early 90’s, transmission of sound and video over the Internet
remained a huge challenge. It was not until 1995, when
technology was able to cope with the requirements of online
streaming, that the world’s first live streaming event, a base-
ball match between the New York Yankees and the Seattle
Mariners, was broadcasted by Progressive Networks [7]. Ever
since, the online video utilization has risen massively, now
with a million minutes of video traversing the Internet every
second [38].
This massive consumption and endorsement of online video
brought with it the rise of extremely popular services for free
live streaming (FLIS). FLIS services enable free viewership of
video content, albeit typically without the consent of a content
owner, of TV channels and live events for Internet users. These
services manage infrastructure to facilitate costless anonymous
broadcasting of live streams, and maintain websites to index
links for free live streams.
Like any other widely embraced online video service, the
emergence of FLIS has given lift to digital copyright infringe-
ments. In fact, multibillion-dollar industries have been directly
affected by these services. As a case in point, an estimated cost
of FLIS to a particular soccer league was more than 15 million
dollars per year, and that was only because of a single free live
streaming website [31], [45]. It is also worth to note that TV
broadcasters had invested more than 3 billion dollars for the
exclusive rights of this league’s event. Same is the case with
other events where billions of dollars were invested to acquire
the broadcasting rights that are illicitly being monetized by the
FLIS services [16], [24]. These incidents highlight the extent
of the damages FLIS services are causing to TV broadcast and
related industries.
Apart from the copyright infringements, there is another
serious, and practically unexplored, threat imposed by the
FLIS services to their users i.e., deceptive exploitation for
monetary gains. To date, FLIS services have been analyzed
mostly from a legal perspective [28], [50]. However, to the best
of our knowledge, there has been no study that systematically
analyzes the workings of different FLIS parties and empirically
assesses the threats for everyday users of FLIS services.
To this end, we argue that a careful analysis and thorough
understanding of FLIS services is necessary for effectively
combating them. It can enable the take-downs that will disrupt
the free illegal live streaming operations [8], [9], [43], the
identification of parties facilitating anonymous free broadcasts
of live streams, and it is critical for shedding light on the
malicious practices used to monetize the FLIS business.
In this paper, we highlight the negative effect of FLIS on
users and expose the infrastructure of the FLIS ecosystem.
Particularly, we target web based sports-specific FLIS services.
The reason to target these services is that they are immensely
popular1, constantly emerging [16], [24], and often reported
for copyright law violations [31], [45]. To uncover the FLIS
ecosystem and quantify the threats to FLIS users, we conduct
the following three-pronged analysis:
First, we develop an infrastructure that enables us to (1)
gather unknown FLIS webpages by leveraging the infrastruc-
ture of search engines and, (2) inspect network traffic to iden-
tify the parties providing media servers for free anonymous
broadcasting of live streams. Using our infrastructure, we
identify more than 23,000 FLIS webpages corresponding to
1The most popular FLIS domain, rojadirecta.me, we analyze have a global
Alexa rank of 1,553 with an estimated 8 million visits on this site monthly.
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5,685 domains. Next, we perform more than 850,000 visits to
the identified FLIS domains and analyze more than 1 Terabyte
of traffic to identify the parties providing media servers. Of
these identified parties, we notice that 64% have been reported
at least once for violating the copyrights of respective owners.
Additionally, our investigations reveal that the FLIS services
host their infrastructure predominantly in Europe and Belize.
For instance, we discover that nearly 25% of the inspected
free live sport streams were broadcasted from media servers
hosted in Belize, and more than 60% of identified streams
were broadcasted from media servers located in Switzerland,
Belize, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Canada.
Second, through a series of automated and manual experi-
ments, we find that FLIS services are involved in substandard
advertisement practices, possible trademark infringements, and
deceptive exploitations, targeting their users as well as TV
broadcasters and sports organizations. Among others, by ana-
lyzing video overlay ads and 30,354 advertisement websites,
we show that the users of FLIS services are often exposed to
deceptive, unavoidable, and malicious ads. Our analysis reveal
that one out of two ad websites, presented to the FLIS service
users, is malicious in nature, offering malware (zero-day in
one case), showing fake law enforcement messages to collect
purported fines, and luring users to install malicious browser
extensions. Additionally, we unintentionally find seven FLIS
domains distributing malware disguised as as an application
to watch free live streams on mobile devices.
Last, given the intensity of possible copyright violations and
discovered threats, we present a FLIS classifier that aims to
classify the FLIS webpages both effectively and efficiently.
Instead of relying on signature-based techniques, the FLIS
classifier models representative attributes of FLIS pages which
achieve a high detection accuracy with a negligible false
positive rate. Our data gathering infrastructure demonstrates
a real-world utilization of our classifier where it was deployed
in an online process to identify unknown FLIS pages. As
an application, our classifier can be readily used by law
enforcement to find previously unknown FLIS websites that
can then be analyzed for potential abuses.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF FREE LIVE STREAMING SERVICES
In this section, we map the ecosystem of free live streaming
services. The FLIS ecosystem, as shown in Figure 1, consists
of three main parties: channel providers, aggregators, and
advertisers. We arrived at this model through the analysis
of investigated FLIS services, and through the recording of
common attributes. We now provide an overview of the iden-
tified FLIS parties, followed by a discussion of their business
model (Section II-A), and their tactics for monetizing user
views (Section II-B).
Channel Providers are the entities that provide the infras-
tructure to facilitate live streaming on the Web. Specifically,
the channel provider maintains a media server that can be
used by anyone for free. The purpose of the media server is
to receive a live video stream from a remote machine (origin
machine) and broadcast it to a wide range of viewers on the
Internet. The origin machine can be operated by the channel
provider itself or it may belong to a different third-party. For
instance, a miscreant can digitally capture a live TV broadcast
of any sport event and stream it online anonymously for free,
thanks to the media server maintained by the channel provider.
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Figure 1: Overview of the operational model of FLIS. Ê The
channel provider maintains a media server to freely broadcast
live streams received from the origin machines and provides
embedding-code with a Flash player. Ë The aggregator cata-
logs embedding-codes and index links of live streams on its
webpage. Ì A visitor lands on the aggregator’s page and clicks
on the indexed links, redirected to the FLIS video page on the
aggregator’s domain, and finds the ads displayed on the video
player by the ad networks. Í Money flows from the advertiser
to the ad network, the aggregator, and the channel provider.
To facilitate a free-of-cost live streaming service, chan-
nel providers usually maintain a simple web interface (e.g.,
jjcast.com, biggestplayer.me). When a user wishes to broadcast
her stream for free, she creates a channel (on air broadcast)
on the channel provider’s web interface. After creating the
channel, she gets a media-server URL to use with her origin
machine for transmitting the media traffic through the channel
provider’s media server. Along with the media-server URL,
she also receives stream-embedding code to place on her
page, at the position where she wants the live stream to
appear. The stream-embedding code is an HTML snippet or
JavaScript code that creates the HTML snippet, in the form of
an <iframe> element. It usually contains a customized Flash
player from the channel provider along with the necessary
configurations to broadcast the live stream. The general format
of the stream-embedding code given by channel providers is
as follows:
<script type="text/javascript"
src="http://channel-provider.com/
embed.php?stream=stream_key
&width=650
&height=450">
</script>
Aggregators catalog the stream-embedding codes, usually
from different channel providers, and index links of various
free live streams in their webpage. In other words, they provide
a single site to watch numerous live events and TV channels
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for free. When a user lands on one of these websites, she is
typically offered 2-3 links per live event. Once a user clicks
the link, she is redirected to the FLIS video page, hosted on
the same domain, where the stream-embedding code executes.
This execution renders the Flash player on the page and
automatically starts a live stream broadcast from the channel
provider’s media server.
In general, channel provider services and aggregator web-
pages can be maintained for both legitimate and illicit pur-
poses. In this paper we focus on the entities that enable live
streaming of the sports events and sports TV channels for free.
Hereafter we use the term channel providers and aggregators
to refer exclusively to those parties that manage infrastructure
to broadcast free live sports events and index links of free live
sports streams on their webpages.
A. The FLIS Ecosystem
We illustrate the FLIS ecosystem in terms of the business
model of different parties involved.
Channel Providers. As mentioned earlier, the channel
provider supplies the stream-embedding code for free live
streaming. This code, along with the Flash player, carries
additional JavaScript code from an ad network. This script
displays ads on the top of the Flash player as overlay ads
using <iframe> elements. The overlay ads are images or
Flash content that “overlays” the video content and runs
concurrently with the live stream [13]. Usually, the channel
providers generate revenue from the overlay ads through
cost-per-thousand (CPT) or click-through-rate (CTR) reporting
metrics. While CPT is calculated by dividing the cost of an
overlay ad placement by the number of impressions (expressed
in thousands) that it generates, CTR is measured as the ratio
of the number of times an overlay ad was displayed to the
number of times it was clicked. We observe that, to maximize
their profit, channel providers often include Javascript code
from different ad networks. As an outcome, FLIS viewers have
to interact with various overlay ads superimposed on top of
each other, usually displayed in the middle of the player.
Aggregators. Like channel providers, the main source of
revenue for aggregators is through advertisements. Aggrega-
tors use a variety of ad techniques that include pop-unders,
pop-ups, and even overlay ads on the Flash player2. The
aggregators include remote JavaScript code from ad networks
that examine the composition of the aggregator page and
present ads from other third-party sources. In addition to CPT
and CTR, aggregator webpages also earn revenue through
cost-per-click (CPC), i.e., the aggregator domain receives a
commission from the ad network each time a user clicks on
the delivered ad.
Advertisers. Advertisers and ad networks are the lifeblood
of the FLIS ecosystem. As mentioned before, both channel
providers and aggregators include JavaScript code from ad
networks to monetize their operations. The ad network’s code
fetches and displays ads from different advertisers on top of
the Flash player. If a user clicks on any of these ads, the
2Since the Flash video player is rendered on the aggregator page, the
aggregator can display overlay ads on the top of the player regardless of
already present overlay ads that were served through the channel provider’s
stream-embedding code. This is typically achieved by using the spatial
coordinates of <iframe> responsible for rendering the Flash video player.
website of the corresponding advertiser is opened, typically
redirected through the ad network’s tracking procedure. The
advertiser will pay the ad network for the visitor, who, in turn,
will pay the publisher (in this case either the channel provider
or the aggregator) based on the pre-negotiated payment model
i.e., CPT, CTR, or CPC.
B. Monetizing User Views
First and foremost, FLIS services employ deceptive tech-
niques for monetary gains. Millions of users utilize the FLIS
services in order to watch live sport events. As such, earning
money from this massive user base is the key objective
of the FLIS parties. To fulfill this objective, FLIS services
make heavy use of substandard and deceptive advertisement
techniques to monetize their business at the expense of user
security. As a case in point, a user of FLIS webpage typically
encounters a number of malicious overlay ads that are stuffed
on the video player. These ads are usually loaded with a num-
ber of deceptive techniques. One such technique is to emboss
the video player with fake close buttons. This technique can
deceive a user to naively click on the fake button, potentially
exposing her to malware-laden websites. In Section IV, we
analyze several types of abuse and show the kind of deceptions
and infections a user can experience while using FLIS services.
Additionally, FLIS parties are repeatedly reported for copy-
right infringements. As the owners of the broadcasting rights,
sports organizations and TV channels hold exclusive rights
on any broadcast of their games online. Law enforcement
agencies can detect and block any domain or IP address that
is involved in the broadcast of illegal sport streams based on
their respective territorial jurisdiction [12], [16], [43], hence
making it difficult to continue the lucrative FLIS business.
Therefore, hiding behind third-parties and using a location
with a flexible, or non-existent, jurisdiction are the usual
practices of the FLIS parties. Moreover, the FLIS parties often
take advantage of certain territorial laws by claiming that they
are not involved in direct copyright infringements [28], [47].
Aggregators claim to only index links to the live sport streams,
and channel providers argue that they only appear as a media
server providers that transmit streams of an unrelated third
party. In Section IV, we analyze the hosting preferences of
the FLIS parties, their concealment of ownership, and the
copyright removal requests submitted against them.
III. DATA GATHERING AND IDENTIFICATION
In this section, we first describe how we identified the
aggregator domains by leveraging search engines and explain
the different phases of our data collection. We then present
our methodology for identifying channel providers by analyz-
ing the network traffic of live streams obtained through the
crawling of numerous FLIS video pages.
A. Gathering Aggregator Domains
As a starting point to discover aggregator webpages, we
searched for the string “free live sport streaming” in Google.
From the search results, we manually identified 500 aggregator
pages that index links to watch live sport streams for free.
To increase the coverage of our analysis and find new ag-
gregator webpages, we opt for a guided search approach, i.e.,
an approach “guided” by the knowledge of known aggregator
webpages (seeds) to find new ones. We chose this approach as
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Figure 2: Guided search approach to find aggregator domains.
it has been proven effective in the context of finding unknown
malicious webpages [29], [39] and because it leverages the
infrastructure of search engines (such as Google) that have
indexed a great part of the web.
Figure 2 shows the work-flow of our approach. We use the
500 manually verified aggregator pages as seeds and visit
each page using a crawler based on Selenium3, a testing
framework for web applications, while storing the HTML of
every loaded <frame> and <iframe> element, acquiring
all images in the page, logging network traffic, and taking
a screenshot of the webpage. In a next step, we leverage
the Google search engine to find pages that contain similar
attributes as the known aggregator pages. To do this, we use
the crawled data of the seed pages to extract search queries
that, when submitted to Google, return URLs that are likely
to be aggregator pages. However, not all URLs returned from
Google will necessarily belong to aggregator pages. Thus, as
a next logical step, we crawled each URL returned by the
search engine and employed a novel classifier to filter the non-
FLIS aggregator pages in an automated fashion. However, this
filtering is not perfectly accurate, and still requires manual
verification of the webpages to eradicate any classification
errors. Therefore, as a final step, we manually checked several
hundred classified aggregator pages and separated the verified
pages for our subsequent analysis. We now provide details on
the different phases of our data gathering approach.
Query generation. This phase aims to extract relevant queries
from the crawled data of seeds to search for new aggregator
pages. To do this, we extracted terms from the known aggre-
gator pages that are highly indicative of FLIS services, and
can be used as subsequent search engine queries to find URLs
of pages that are likely to be FLIS aggregator webpages. The
problem here lies in the fact that aggregator pages, in general,
hardly contain any text except for the links for live streaming.
As a result, it is not always possible to extract strings from
the main body of an aggregator page. Therefore, we focus
on interpreting the <meta> elements, located in <head>
container of HTML, that provide structured information about
the page in specified tags. We noticed that almost every
seed page includes a <meta> element named keywords
that contains terms highly relevant to the FLIS aggregator
pages. For instance, some of the interesting keyword terms
we observed in the seed aggregator pages were: firstrow,
myp2p, rojadirecta, atdhe, and ilemi. All these terms are highly
indicative of FLIS aggregator pages and proved to be effective
queries for discovering a wide variety of unknown aggregator
pages. To this end, we extracted the keyword strings from the
500 seed pages and submitted them as queries to Google. The
results returned by Google were stored for further analysis.
3https://code.google.com/p/selenium/
Classification. Overall, submitting the extracted queries to
Google yielded nearly 500,000 URLs. To quickly filter the
non-aggregator pages, we designed and employed a novel
classifier to automatically identify pages that are likely to be
FLIS aggregator webpages. We first trained a model (using the
known aggregator pages) by extracting several representative
features, some of which take advantage of the inherent nature
of the FLIS services. We provide details on the extracted
features and classifier in Section V. Once the model is trained,
we use it to identify aggregator webpages by crawling the
URLs that were acquired from the search engine results. For
each crawled webpage, the engineered features are extracted
and passed to the trained model for classification, which
outputs a score indicating the URL’s relevance to the FLIS
aggregator page. If the score is greater than a given threshold,
the model labels the URL as an aggregator page. In order to
gather accurate data with high confidence, we set a threshold
value that results in an outcome false positive rate of nearly
10−3 with a detection rate of more than 90%.
Verification. To verify the results of the classification phase,
we manually checked several hundred labeled URLs. These
URLs are randomly selected from the discarded pages as well
as from the pages that were labeled as aggregator webpages.
Through this process we aim to limit the false positives as
much as possible for our subsequent analysis.
Limitations. Our data collection methodology that leverages
the infrastructure of search engines has two main limitations.
First, it is possible that search engines may not index FLIS
webpages that violate copyrights laws. Second, the effective-
ness of finding new aggregator webpages is dependent on the
quantity and diversity of the known pages that we used to
generate queries for the search engines. This can be improved
by considering a larger and more diverse collection of aggre-
gator pages. Additionally, we can analyze other sources to find
new aggregator domains, like social media and public fora for
FLIS. However, we found that these sources are rare, usually
outdated, and only provide links to a selection of famous free
live streaming webpages.
B. Identifying Channel Providers
In order to investigate the channel providers that maintain
the media servers for free live streaming, we first sampled
the 1,000 most popular aggregator domains (according to
the Alexa ranking) from a set of verified aggregator pages.
We then crawled each sampled domain and extracted the
streaming URLs indexed on the page by interpreting the <a>
elements. Accordingly, we filtered any URL that belongs to an
advertisement network. Afterwards, we crawled the remaining
URLs by sandboxing the instances of our crawler, each in a
separate Linux Network Namespace. This sandboxing allows
us to capture the network traffic of live media streams from an
individual webpage, while crawling multiple pages in parallel.
At the same time, we instructed our crawler to interpret every
loaded <frame> or <iframe> in the page recursively4,
store their HTML, source URLs, and their location and size
on the webpage.
4We use the Selenium’s ChromeDriver with args --disable-web-security to
disable the Same Origin Policy while crawling the webpages.
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(Invoke) "connect"
(Transaction ID) 1.0
(Object1) {
app:"live", flashVer: "LNX 16,0,0,296",
swfUrl: "http://popeoftheplayers.eu/atdedead.swf",
tcUrl: "rtmp://rtmp.popeoftheplayers.eu:1935/live",
fpad: false, capabilities: 9947.75,
audioCodecs: 3191, videoCodecs: 252,
videoFunction: 1 ,
pageUrl: "http://popeoftheplayers.eu/crichd.php?
id=35&width=600&height=450",
objectEncoding: 3.0}
Figure 3: An example RTMP connect message used to identify
the channel provider popeoftheplayers.eu.
Detecting live streams. Once the crawling process is finished,
we inspected the network trace of every crawled webpage
to find channel providers transmitting live media streams.
Inspecting network traffic to find channel providers (or em-
bedded players for media streaming) is much more precise
than inspecting Flash embedded objects, <iframe> and
<script> elements. This is because Flash embedding is
frequently used for other purposes than video, such as small
applications, games, and audio. Similarly, the identification of
live streams via the use of specific iframes and scripts would
require us to compile a whitelist of non-malicious resources.
By focusing on network traces, we can inspect the
network trace of every crawled webpage by crafting a
set of network signatures for various media streaming
protocols and their variants, e.g, RTMP [5], HLS [1],
and RTSP [6]. Our goal is to identify the presence of
media traffic after the page load, and to find the channel
provider transmitting these streams. We crafted these
signatures to capture the protocol keywords present in
the media streaming protocol messages (e.g., connect
in RTMP [5]) [22], [40], [41]. In addition, we also built
signatures to detect the MIME types specific to the streaming
protocols that are based on HTTP (e.g., Content-Type:
application/vnd.apple.mpegurl corresponds to
HLS protocol). We then applied these custom-built signatures
to all TCP and UDP connections in a network trace of
the crawled page regardless of ports used. This allows
us to analyze media streams that are transmitted using
standard protocols on non-standard ports or streams that are
encapsulated in plain-text protocols (e.g., RTMP tunneled
in HTTP etc.). We found that both of these practices are
common in the investigated FLIS services.
Interpreting media sources. Once the network signature
matches, we try to automatically extract a source of the
media server to identify the channel provider facilitating
the FLIS. We found that the majority (85.7%) of media
streams identified by our signatures were broadcasted using
unencrypted variants of RTMP. In this case, we search for an
RTMP connect message that is used to establish a network
connection between the client (i.e., Flash player) and the media
server. Figure 3 shows such a message sent to the channel
provider popeoftheplayers.eu. This message contains, among
other parameters, swfUrl: the URL of the Flash player,
tCurl: the URL of the media server, and pageUrl: the
URL of the page in which the Flash player was rendered. Note
that the pageUrl in RTMP connect messages is the source
URL of <iframe> that embeds a Flash player on the page.
Aggregators Channel Providers
Seeds 500 Inspected domains 1,000
SE URLs 513,324 URLs visited 859,126
URLs classified 23,549 Streams found 52,469
Unique domains 5,685 Channel providers 309
Table I: Summary of dataset gathered and analyzed.
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Figure 4: Distribution of FLIS aggregator websites in the
Alexa top 1 million websites.
The other media streams that our signatures identified were
broadcasted using HLS (8.1%) and encrypted RTMP (6.2%)
from the media servers managed by just two different channel
providers. In these cases, we use the HTTP Host header and
source IP to identify the channel provider.
Dataset summary. We now provide a summary of the dataset
gathered and analyzed in our study. The figures are summa-
rized in Table I. We used 500 manually inspected aggregator
pages to generate search engine queries, and subjected 513,234
URLs for classification of aggregator domains. We detected
more than 23,000 aggregator URLs which correspond to more
than 5,000 aggregator domains. We manually verified all the
aggregator domains and performed more than 850,000 visits
on the selected top 1,000 aggregator domains, analyzing more
than 1 Terabyte of traffic. Our network signatures identified
52,469 media streams broadcasted from the infrastructure of
only 309 channel providers. The modest proportion of streams
identified is due to the fact that our crawler visited the URLs
indexed on the aggregator pages and not all of these URLs
correspond to pages that were broadcasting live streams when
being visited by our crawler.
IV. ANALYSIS OF FLIS SERVICES
In this section, we analyze several aspects and practices of
FLIS services. We start by inspecting the gathered dataset and
provide insights about the ownership and hosting preferences
of the FLIS parties. Next, we use Google Transparency Report
to measure copyright removal requests submitted against FLIS
parties. Furthermore, we design various methodologies to
inspect and report: possible trademark abuse in FLIS domains;
substandard, unavoidable, and deceptive advertisement set-
ups; unexplored threats to FLIS users, such as unknown mal-
ware, fraudulent money grabbing scams, malicious browser
extensions; and link hijacking threats.
A. Operational Insights
FLIS popularity. From the collected 5,685 aggregator do-
mains, 50.74% were part of Alexa’s top 1 million websites
ranking. Figure 4 shows the distribution of the collected
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Figure 5: Relative distribution of the geographical location for
aggregator websites. The size of each dot indicates the number
of times a country is more prevalent in the distribution of
aggregator websites compared to the distribution of the top
100,000 websites.
aggregator domains across the ranks of Alexa. As we can see
from graph, nearly 22% of the aggregator domains are part
of Alexa’s top 100,000 websites. In fact, the most popular
aggregator domain in our corpus is rojadirecta.me, having
a global Alexa rank of 1,553 with an estimated 8 million
monthly visits5. Our findings confirm that the aggregator
domains are immensely popular and millions of users visit
these pages to watch daily updated free live streams.
Aggregator ownership. To get an understanding of aggregator
domains ownership, we performed a WHOIS lookup of the
top 1,000 aggregator domains. We found that 760 out of
the 1,000 domains have anonymized WHOIS records. For
the remaining 240 domains, 52 belong to 6 distinct groups
based on an identical name, email address, and organization
name in their WHOIS record. The largest 2 groups contain 15
and 14 domains respectively, with all the domains in each
group resolving to two specific IP addresses. Interestingly,
the majority of the domains in both groups have the string
“firstrow” common in their name. Overall, we were able to
find 194 distinct domain owners to which the 240 domains
belong.
Aggregator hosting location. In order to gain insights on
the preferred geographical locations of aggregator domains,
we computed the relative distribution of countries in which
aggregator domains are hosted. More concretely, we performed
a GeoIP lookup for all the aggregator domains and compared
the distribution of hosting location to the distribution in the
top 100,000 Alexa domains, which we used as a baseline.
For the 10% of aggregator domains that resolved to an IP
address of CloudFlare6, we used two techniques which are
known to disclose the original IP address of a CloudFlare-
protected domain [35]. Using both techniques, we managed to
uncover the actual IP address of 233 aggregator domains. The
other aggregator websites for which we could not uncover the
IP address, were excluded from the geographical distribution.
Figure 5 shows the relative distribution of the geographic
location of aggregator services. From this graph, it is clear
that, relative to the baseline distribution of the Alexa 100,000
websites, the distribution of aggregator websites is centered
mainly around Europe. For instance, we found that the re-
5http://www.trafficestimate.com/rojadirecta.me
6Cloudflare.com provides DNS services and sits between the visitor and
the CloudFlare user’s hosting provider. In fact, it behaves as a reverse proxy
for a website and hides its original IP address.
Hosting Hosting AS # %
Company Country Number CP Streams
privatelayer.com Switzerland 51852 14 11.7%
koddos.com Belize 199636 11 24.2%
ecatel.net Netherlands 29073 10 12.7%
ovh.ca Canada 16276 10 1.2%
portlane.com Sweden 42708 7 10.5%
Table II: Top hosting companies’ infrastructure employed by
the channel providers for hosting their media servers.
public of Moldova appears approximately 20 times more
frequent in the distribution of aggregator services. Similarly,
the prevalence of several other European countries–including
Switzerland, Czech Republic and Luxembourg–is more than
ten times higher than in the distribution of the top 100,000
domains. Outside of Europe, we found Belize and Panama to
be the most popular hosting locations for aggregator domains.
Channel provider ownership. Similar to the aggregator
domains, we performed a WHOIS lookup on all the 309
identified channel provider domains. We found that 220 out
of 309 channel provider domains have anonymized WHOIS
records. Based on identical name, organization, and email
in the WHOIS records, we were only able to identify a
single group with four channel providers that belongs to the
same owner. In addition, we observed that 31% of channel
providers use the CloudFlare’s services. Unlike aggregator
domains, finding a real IP address of a channel provider is
trivial. We inspect the media traffic and in 98% of cases a
real IP was found by resolving the media-server domain, e.g.,
rtmp.popeoftheplayers.eu in Figure 3.
Channel provider hosting. Once we have the original IPs,
we used myip.ms, an online hosting information service, to
determine which hosting company has been delegated the
IP address of a channel provider’s media server. Table II
shows the top 5 hosting companies employed by the channel
providers including each company’s geolocation, the assigned
autonomous system (AS) number, the number of channel
providers (CP) using the service, and the percentage of to-
tal streams originating from its infrastructure. We can see
that more than 60% of the analyzed streams originate from
the media servers provided by only 5 companies. Most of
these companies are based in Europe. Outside of Europe,
koddos.com, with all channel provider’s servers in Belize,
accounts for nearly 25% of all the observed media traffic.
Other prevalent companies we found employed by more than
one channel provider are located in Canada, Czech Republic,
Romania, Ukraine, and the United States.
Overall, our analysis reveals that a significant number
of FLIS parties have anonymized WHOIS records or use
CloudFlare to conceal their hosting infrastructure. Moreover,
the FLIS parties usually prefer Europe and Belize to host
their infrastructure. One reasonable explanation of this trend
can be that the FLIS parties may want to take advantage of
certain jurisdictional benefits by hosting their infrastructure in
territories with complex, or flexible, copyright laws [2], [44].
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B. Copyright Removal Requests
In order to measure the number of copyright removal
requests submitted against FLIS parties, we used Google
Transparency Report7 data that contains detailed information
on requests by copyright owners or their representatives to re-
move URLs from Google search. At the time of our evaluation,
this data contained 48,719,483 records of reported domains–
roughly 95% of the copyright removal requests that Google
has received since July 2011.
Findings. We used this data to find copyright removal requests
against 5,685 aggregator domains and found that more than
30% have been reported at least once by copyright owners.
While the majority of domains have been reported less than
50 times, there is a significant number of domains reported
repeatedly by copyright owners–with cricfree.tv being the
top reported domain among the investigated websites. At the
time of writing, some of the domains we analyzed have
already been taken down by the U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement and City Police of London [8], [9].
Similar to the aggregators, we also examined the copyright
removal requests against 309 channel providers. In total, we
found that a large number of channel providers, 199 out of
309 (64.4%), have been reported at least once by copyright
owners. The most commonly reported channel provider, p3g.
tv, has been reported 789 times–with a median value of 28
filed reports per week from February 2015 to June 2015.
Overall, while our analysis of copyright removal requests
from Google Transparency Report can not be treated as ground
truth for copyright violations committed by the investigated
FLIS parties, it clearly raises questions about the lawfulness
of FLIS operations.
C. Possible Trademark Infringements
Trademark infringements do not directly affect sports orga-
nizations and TV broadcasters in the same way as copyright
violations, but they can have a serious impact on both in-
dustries. The Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
(ACPA) prohibits the use of trademark domain names and
logos that create confusion among viewers as to the source or
sponsorship of the webpage. As such, a FLIS website should,
in principle, always avoid trademark infringements.
Domain name. The infringement of domain name trademarks
can be categorized into two forms: confusability and dilution.
While confusability deals with trademark infringement in
cases where the trademark domain is not well-known, dilution
deals with leveraging the reputable trademark of a third
party to refer to something unrelated–e.g., skysportslive.tv,
skyembed.com. Associating “sky” with “live” and “embed”
could dilute the powerful association between “Sky Sports”
TV channel and “live streaming” in the mind of the average
Internet user. This practice can be therefore presumed as a
possible trademark infringement.
To measure the prevalence of possible trademark infringe-
ments in FLIS services, we first compiled three comprehensive
lists containing the names of popular sports TV channels,
leagues, and organizations. These lists are compiled from
a variety of sources including, but not limited to, official
websites of FIFA, ICC, and NBA. Next, we use the en-
tries in these lists to search for similar substrings in all of
7http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/copyright/
5,685 aggregator domain names. To search for substrings,
we normalized the aggregator domains by removing all de-
limiters, non-alphanumeric characters, and top level domains.
In addition, we also searched for several distinct keywords
(such as “sky” in the previously mentioned example) in the
normalized aggregator domains. Finally, if the search exposes
the existence of a clearly similar name of sports TV channel,
league, or organization, we manually analyzed the domain and
labeled it as a potential trademark-infringing domain.
Findings. Overall, out of the 5,685 investigated aggregator
domains, we found 439 (7.72%) domains using trademarks of
well known sports TV channels, leagues, and organizations.
More specifically, 176 domains (3.09%) were found clearly
utilizing the name of sports TV channels, 67 domains (1.17%)
were found to use the name of sport organizations (e.g, FIFA
etc.), and the remaining 196 domains (3.44%) were using
trademarks of popular leagues in their domain names.
Trademark logo. In addition to possible trademark infringe-
ments in the domain names, we also found that a number of
aggregator websites are using the logos of popular sports TV
channels. Under ACPA, the unauthorized use of a trademark
logo in such a way as to cause viewers of the webpage
to believe that the page is affiliated with the respective TV
channel, is prohibited.
In order to measure the prevalence of trademark logo utiliza-
tion in aggregator websites, we downloaded several hundred
sports TV channel logos from Google Images. Next, we use
the downloaded images as an oracle and employ a light-
weight image genre recognition method to quickly identify
the webpages that contains images of trademark logos. (We
provide details on image recognition method in Section V.)
Finally, we manually analyzed the screenshot of each identified
page to verify the presence of popular TV channel logos.
Findings. Two trends in the utilization of trademark logos
were observed. First, we found that the aggregator pages use
the TV channel logos as the link to the FLIS video page.
Second, we noticed that some aggregator pages employ the
TV channel’s logo as the main logo of their page (e.g.,
starsportslive.tv, skysportslive.tv). Overall, out of the 5,685 in-
vestigated aggregator domains, we found 282 (4.9%) domains
using the logos of popular sports TV channels.
While utilization of trademark logos and domain names may
not necessarily be categorized as trademark abuse (depending
on jurisdiction in respective territories), such practices can
easily confuse users about the nature of a FLIS service, which
can, in turn, increase the probability of malware infections, as
those described in the following sections.
D. Substandard, Deceptive, and Unavoidable Advertisement
In the context of this study, we analyze overlay ads that
are unique to the online video services.8 As described earlier
(Section II-A), the overlay ads are displayed using <iframe>
elements. These ads are typically served as images or Flash
content that “overlays” the video content, usually superim-
posed on each other, running concurrently with the streaming
8Although, aggregators also use a variety of other ad methods to monetize
their business (e.g., pop-under, pop-up etc.), we believe considering the
overlay ads in our analysis potentially covers a significant breadth of illicit
activities, while examining an involvement of all the key parties in the FLIS
ecosystem i.e., the channel provider, the aggregator, and the advertisers.
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Figure 6: Overlay ads example on video player taken from the
popular FLIS website cricket-365.co.in. Numerous malicious
overlays are stuffed on the video player, covering most part
of the video player, while employing social engineering and
deceptive techniques.
content. Both the aggregators and the channel providers, using
an advertiser script, can overlay these ads. While watching a
live sport event, a user is often presented with a number of
overlay ads, generally blocking most part of the video player,
and often requiring an action by the viewer to close them.
Figure 6 shows one such example, displaying a number of po-
tentially malicious overlay ads, super imposed on each other,
employing both social engineering and deceptive techniques
(e.g., fake close buttons , fake video play button etc.), while
blocking more than 75% area of the Flash player.
This practice of displaying ads not only lures a user into
clicking a potentially malicious ad, but also goes against any
given standard of the online advertisement industry. In this
regard, we performed an empirical analysis to investigate the
FLIS services’ compliance, in displaying overlay ads, with the
Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB) standards.
Compliance with IAB standards. IAB is an organization
that develops standards for the online advertising industry. It
has defined metrics that deal with the behaviors specific to the
nonlinear (overlay) video ads [13]. According to these metrics,
an overlay ad should not cover more than 1/5 (20%) of the
height of a player, with the best practice to display the ad at
the bottom half of the streaming content.
To measure the FLIS services’ compliance with IAB stan-
dards, we analyzed the crawled data that was used to iden-
tify the channel providers (see Section III-B for details).
Along with the network traffic, this data contains HTML
code, source URL, and absolute location and size of all
<iframe> elements of each crawled webpage (iframes-log).
We selected 44,960 pages from this data that were identified
to be broadcasting live streams using the RTMP protocol.
Next, we extracted the pageUrl from the network traffic of
each crawled webpage by interpreting the RTMP connect
message (Figure 3). This pageUrl corresponds to the source
URL of an <iframe> that embeds a Flash player in the
webpage. Once we have identified the source URL of the
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Figure 7: Heat map where the color strength indicates the
average number of overlay ads on video players, and the
percentage reflects ads superimposed on each other at the
particular location on players.
<iframe> that embeds a Flash player, we use the iframes-
log to identify its location and size on the page (same as
the position and size of the rendered Flash player). Finally,
we again use the iframes-log to measure the occurrences and
positions of other <iframe> elements (i.e., overlay ads)
overlapping the area of Flash player. Doing this allows us
to measure the average concentration of ads presented on the
player by the FLIS services. Moreover, we can calculate the
percentage of the player’s area covered by the overlays.
Findings. Our measurements reveal that on average, there are
5-6 overlays present on the video players in the investigated
FLIS webpages. Furthermore, on average, 93% of the video
players were stuffed with overlays, hiding more than 80%
area of the player. We observe that the majority of these ads
consist of fake-button images displayed exactly in the center
of a player to trick users into clicking. As such, this trickery
directly benefits the FLIS services which earn ad commissions
from unintended clicks on the ads. We also noticed that most of
the displayed overlay ads were hidden under additional overlay
ads. Figure 7 shows a heat map indicating the average number
of ads as a color strength on a player, with 7 being highest and
1 being lowest. Furthermore, it shows the average percentage
of ads superimposed on each other at different locations on the
player. We can clearly observe that the majority of the overlays
presented by the FLIS services were placed in the middle of
video players, with more than 81% overlapping each other.
Anti-Adblock. The reader may realize that a user can avoid
interactions with the overlay ads by using popular ad-block ex-
tensions. These extensions remove advertisements so that the
player area otherwise stuffed with overlay ads can be cleared to
view the live stream. For each visited FLIS page broadcasting
live stream, we tested whether the page employed anti-adblock
scripts to identify or bypass adblocking extensions.
Findings. Overall, we discovered that out of the top 1,000 in-
vestigated aggregator domains, 163 (16.3%) employed scripts
that attempt to detect and defeat the ad-blockers. We noticed
two most commonly used scripts. We now briefly detail their
workings.
 advertisement.js. We found that several aggregators in-
clude a script named advertisement.js. By inspecting
several versions of this script, we discovered that the mere
purpose of these scripts is making a modification to the page’s
Document Object Model (DOM). Since the popular browser
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% % %
Browsers Malware Scam Adult
Safari 75.71% 1.19% 4.40%
Chrome 67.26% 1.81% 1.29%
Firefox 38.65% 2.15% 5.31%
Internet Explorer 34.22% 11.3% 2.72%
Average 53.96% 4.11% 3.43%
Table III: The nature of ad websites opened after interacting
with the overlay ads displayed on the video players using four
different user-agent strings. The percentage values are given
according to the labeled categories: malware, scam, and adult.
extensions used to filter advertisements (e.g., AdBlock, Ad-
Block Plus), block any script named advertisement.js,
these DOM modification are not made when such an extension
is present. This provides the aggregators with an oracle to
detect the presence of an ad-blocker, which can then be used
to force users to disable their ad-blockers.
 antiblock. Similar to the ad-block detection technique
with advertisement.js, antiblock.org provides a script
that allows website administrators to detect the presence of a
multitude of extensions and plugins that block advertisements.
In addition, the script attempts to avoid detection by a few ad-
block extensions. In case the script detects that advertisements
are still blocked, the default behavior is to make the webpage
inaccessible. This ultimately forces users to disable their ad-
blocking solutions if they want to access the page’s contents.
Our analysis highlights a clear violence of the IAB standards
by the FLIS services in displaying overlay ads on the video
player. Moreover, our findings indicate that the parties in the
FLIS ecosystem undeniably compel their users to interact with
the overlay ads and adopt various deceptive techniques to gain
ad revenue from the unintended clicks.
E. Exposing Users to Malware, Scam, and Adult Websites
In this section, we investigate the ad websites opened when
a user is deceived (or lured) into clicking the overlay ads
displayed on the video player by the FLIS parties. From our
experiments, we noticed that the interaction of users with the
overlay ads opened a variety of ad websites. These sites often
present security threats including exposure to malware, scams,
and link-hijacking.
Automated interaction with overlay video ads. To gather ad
websites that opened when a user interacts with the overlay
ads, we implemented an additional module in our crawler de-
tailed in Section III-B. During the crawl, the module identifies
the <iframe> responsible for rendering the Flash player
by utilizing a whitelist of the identified channel providers.
Afterwards, it uses the iframe-logs and tries to click the
<iframe> elements (i.e., overlay ads etc.), overriding the
Flash player on the webpage. Before clicking an overlay,
the crawler sleeps for 20 seconds to allow any redirections.
Finally, it log any redirections to different domains and capture
the screenshots of the opened ad webpages. Our crawler visits
each page using four different user-agent strings covering
popular browsers and operating systems.
At the end of this process, our crawler collected the screen-
shots of 30,354 ad pages that were opened due to the clicking
of overlays in the top 1,000 aggregator domains. Capturing an
image of the ad page provides us with the essence of what a
user would have been exposed to while interacting with the
overlay ads. We observe that these images contained a large
variety of sites for deceptive malware downloads, scams, and
adult material.
Ethical considerations. To discover whether ads are malicious
or not we have to, unavoidably, deliver clicks on them and
monitor their final destination. As it becomes clear in the next
paragraphs, the vast majority of ads present on FLIS services
are of a malicious nature. This was not a surprise for us since
the nature of ads that we encountered when considering this
project was also mostly malicious and is what prompted us
to conduct this study. We argue that, even though our crawler
may have charged some advertisers9 for the duration of our
crawling experiment, this was probably beneficial for the Web
at large since we absorbed the ads that would have otherwise
victimized real users. Moreover, our crawling methodology is
in line with previous studies that have seeked to understand
online ads [15], [17].
Classifying advertisements. To automatically categorize the
collected ad websites we clustered the pages based on their
visual appearance. We used a perceptual hash function [53]
to automatically cluster the screenshots of the ad pages. A
perceptual hash function returns similar hashes for two images,
if one is visually similar to the other that may have gone
through modifications such as scaling, aspect ratio alterations,
or minor changes in color. We computed the perceptual hash
of all screenshots and cluster them in groups by using the
Hamming distance between hashes as our distance metric. If
the distance between two hashes was less than an empiri-
cally calculated threshold10, we clustered the corresponding
pages. By using the perceptual hash functions, we achieved
a precision of 99.8% and recall of 98.4% (compared against
manually generated ground-truth of 1,000 screenshots). Once
the clustering process finished, we manually verified the
clusters, and examined each cluster for malware, scam, and
adult ads. We categorize ads as malware when they lead to
the installation of malware (binary or browser extension).
Findings. Table III shows the results of our clustering and
labeling, separated by four user-agent. The first thing to notice
is that, on average, 50% of the time, a click on an overlay ad
leads the user to a malware-hosting webpage. The majority of
malware-hosting pages were constructed to imitate the look
and feel of the FLIS services, often trying to trick the user to
install malware by pretending that she needs special software
(binary or extension) to watch the live stream. Figure 8 shows
an example of such a webpage, that was opened after clicking
an overlay ad on stream2watch.com. This page is trying to
trick the user into downloading a malicious plug-in as if it
were provided by original streaming website.
Meanwhile, in Table III, one can notice that specific
browsers were much more exposed to the malware-hosting
webpages than others. Chrome and Safari, the two most
9Most reputed ad networks have deployed detection mechanisms to filter
bot generated clicks and cease charging the advertisers when they identify
artificial traffic [14], [21], [49].
10We select the value 0.3 as threshold. To do that, we computed the
clustering accuracy on a subset of the extracted screenshots for each threshold
value between [0,1] with a step of 0.1 [25]. A threshold of 0.3 achieved best
precision and recall.
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Figure 8: Screenshot of a malicious website that opened after
interacting with overlay ads. The website imitates the look and
feel of the FLIS webpage stream2watch.com to deceive users.
popular browsers, are the ones most exposed to the malware
pages through overlay ad clicking. One logical reason for this
trend is that, as depicted in recent security studies, attackers
are more inclined in targeting the popular browser(s) for ad in-
jections and malversting [48], [51], [30]. As such, for Internet
Explorer and Firefox, it may be more beneficial for malicious
advertisers, along with presenting malware sites, to expose
FLIS users to money laundering scams, adult gaming/video
websites, and fraudulent technician services.
Overall, while advertisers are the root cause for malicious
ads, the involvement of the FLIS parties cannot be entirely
exempted as they expose their users to security threats. From
the prevalence of discovered abuse, it is evident that the FLIS
parties are more inclined towards malicious advertisers to
monetize their operations, exposing their users to malware-
laden domains, fraudulent scams, and adult content.
F. Additional Malicious Activities
Immediate distributor of malware. During our experiment
with overlay ads, we accidentally found that seven simi-
lar aggregator domains resolving to same IP address, were
distributing a malicious Android application. When visited
through a specific mobile browser user agent the website
redirects to m.liveonlinetv247.info. This webpage offers a
complimentary application to watch free live sport streams on
the mobile device. The offered application is an adware known
as Android Airpush. It contains an advertising package that has
the capability to display advertisements without user content
and carry out potential ad fraud. This finding highlights the
direct involvement of the FLIS service in exploiting users for
monetary gains.
Link hijacking. We also observed link hijacking while an-
alyzing the overlay ads in FLIS domains. As mentioned
earlier, FLIS services use advertiser scripts that render multiple
<iframe> elements to place overlay ads on the video player.
This use of an <iframe> adequately separates the advertiser
from the including page, as the advertising scripts cannot
interact with the DOM of the parent frame because of the
Same-Origin Policy (SOP) [11], a web application security
specification. However, there are certain exemptions in SOP
that allow all frames to navigate any other frame which
they can reference. As an example, an advertiser’s overlay
<iframe> can redirect the entire FLIS page to a different tar-
get by using Javascript’s window.top.location.href
method. This method allows any child <iframe> to access
Figure 9: Screenshot of a scam website to which our crawler
was redirected after visiting a FLIS page. The webpage
pretends to be from a regional law enforcement office which
demands a sum of money as a “penalty” for a purported crime
that our crawler committed.
the location of the topmost window, in the windows hierarchy,
and can redirect it to a potentially malicious webpage in the
same tab.
We found that 1.6% of ads displayed on the crawled FLIS
pages had escaped their <iframe> and redirected the entire
page to a malicious website. We observed two different types
of abuses in these malicious websites. In the first type, the
malicious page imitates adobe.com and offers the malware
disguised as the latest version of Adobe Flash. In the second
type, the webpage shows pop-up modals that prevent the
normal use of the browser until the user accepts or rejects the
download or pays the fraudulent ransom. Figure 9 shows an
example of such an ad we observed, demanding a fraudulent
ransom from the regional law enforcement.
G. Malicious Payloads Investigation
To find out more about the nature of malware offered to the
users of FLIS services, we downloaded all the payloads from
the labeled malware ad webpages. We found that based on the
user-agent string, in other words, based on the browser and OS
of a victim, malicious domains present environment-specific
payloads. For instance, a user with a Google Chrome browser
was presented with a malicious extension when redirected to
the ad website. Similarly, an executable was presented for
Firefox running on Microsoft Windows, an Apple Mac image
for Safari OS X and so on. To analyze malware binaries we
used the VirusTotal (VT) service [10], to determine whether
the binary had ever been scanned before and whether it was
labeled as malicious by an antivirus vendor. To examine
malicious Chrome extensions, we leverage the techniques from
[48], [51] and manually analyze the behavior of collected
extensions in the browser.
Malware binaries and their distributors. Table IV sum-
marizes the malware dataset obtained during our analysis of
FLIS services. During our experiments with overlay ads, we
downloaded 12,683 malware payloads, yielding 1,353 distinct
binaries, out of which 629 samples were unknown to VT. This
means, that at the time of scanning the binary using the VT
service, the binary was not in the VT’s database. Of these,
one binary was initially classified as benign by all the AV in
VT and later labeled as malware by a reputable AV after the
few days re-scan. Thus, this file is considered as a zero-day
malware sample. At the same time we noticed that, most of
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Malware Obtained Top Advertisers
Total Binaries 12,863 1. 3c41ddc0.se
Distinct (by SHA1) 1,353 2. s.ad[0-9]{3}m.com
Unknown to VT 629 3. creative.ad[0-9]{3}m.com
Zero-Day 1 4. ad.directrev.com
Malicious domains 96 5. vipcpms.com
Table IV: Summary of malware collected from the ad web-
pages displayed by the FLIS services and top 5 advertisers
leading to malware domains.
Rank Extension Name User base Redirection %
1 iLivid 10,000,000+ 20.72%
2 Search-By-Zooms 1,192,815 17.72%
3 Free-Games-Zone 1,880,238 7.47%
4 Musix-Search 462,934 5.33%
5 Retrogamer 183,675 0.09%
6 Support-our-Cause 115,667 2.34%
7 tabSent 22,340 4.73%
8 Zwinky 20,156 0.09%
9 Search-Point 2,840 1.16%
10 Zapyo 2,648 0.94%
11 GamesFanatic 328 0.02%
Table V: Malicious extensions discovered during the analysis
of overlay ads displayed by the FLIS services.
the malware samples submitted to VT belong to families like
fake installers for malicious browser plug-ins, adwares, and
browser activity monitors.
Most of the websites offering malware were reached due
to a small number of advertisers providing overlay ads. The
right side of the Table IV shows the top 5 advertisers leading
to the malware website when clicked on the overlay ads. These
advertisers are either directly malicious or have been used as
intermediaries in the delivery of malicious ads.
Malicious extensions and their distributors. Table V lists
the 11 extensions we found from the ad websites opened after
clicking on the overlay ads using a Chrome specific user-
agent. The table also shows the percentage of redirections
to the ad websites presenting these extensions. Moreover, the
table presents the user base of each extensions as shown on
the Chrome web store. We can observe that some of these
extensions have millions of active victim users. We manually
analyzed these extensions and flagged several malicious activ-
ities like ad-injection, hijacking new-tab pages, and injection
of malicious <iframe>. Overall, our analysis flagged most
of the extensions as malicious and few of them as suspicious.
It might be the case that the latter category are legitimate
extensions, but we consider this possibility highly unlikely,
as these extensions are neither particularly useful nor well
designed, yet have somehow amassed millions of installations.
Figure 10 shows the redirection chains to the opened
websites, offering the discovered malicious extensions, after
clicking the overlay ads. The graph shows that some of the
domains, like lp.ilividnewtab.com, lp.gamesnewtab.com, can
be reached through several intermediate entities after a click on
an overlay ad. In other cases, we can observe a webpage, pre-
senting a malicious extension, being reached more directly, for
example, zwinky.com, retrogamer.com from a single advertiser
i.e., adcash.com. Overall, these interactions and intermediate
party redirections hide the direct association of the FLIS
services in serving the malicious browser extensions.
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Figure 10: Redirection chains leading to domains offering
malicious browser extensions.
H. Summary of Findings
By performing more than 850,000 visits on the identified
5,685 aggregator domains and by analyzing more than 1
Terabyte of traffic, we found that the majority of the parties in
the FLIS ecosystem are hosting their infrastructure mostly in
Europe and Belize. For instance, we discovered that nearly
25% of live streams originates from the servers hosted in
Belize, and more than 60% of analyzed streams originates
from the media servers provided by only 5 companies lo-
cated in Belize, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and
Canada. Additionally, we found that more than 64% of parties
providing these streams have been reported at least once
for violating the copyrights of content owners. Since only a
handful of channel providers are responsible for broadcasting
the majority of the live streams, we argue that a strict control
on the operations of these entities, can effectively minimize
the volume of illegal live streaming.
In addition, we found that 5-7% FLIS pages leverage
trademark names and logos of popular TV channels and sports
organizations to attract more visitors. Moreover, through a
series of experiments, we found that FLIS services do not
respect the standards for the online advertising. We discovered
that, on average, 93% of the video players on FLIS webpages
were stuffed with overlay ads, hiding more than 80% area
of the player. Furthermore, the displayed overlay ads found
in FLIS services are embossed with deceptive close buttons
to collect unintended clicks from visitors, leading to visitors
opening advertisement websites while trying to close these
overlays.
Finally, we examined the nature of websites opened when
users are deceived (or lured) into clicking on overlay ads.
On average, we found that 50% of ad-related websites are
malicious in nature, offering malware, malicious browser
extensions, and all sorts of scam pages. At the same time,
we discovered that some FLIS services are directly involved
in malware distribution via an Android application. Overall,
these practices, along with the frequent accusation of copyright
infringement, clearly show that FLIS services are inclined
towards intrusive and malicious monetization schemes, at the
expense of user security.
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V. FLIS CLASSIFIER
Given the ever-increasing incidents of copyright violations
and discovered abuse, both against users as well as legitimate
content providers, it is clear that current FLIS services are a
rather parasitic part of the Web. As such, automatic detection
techniques are necessary to identify the aggregator webpages
serving viewers with an index of free streams, most of which
are commonly reported as illegal. To this end, we designed
and developed FLIS classifier, a system that is able to perform
online detection of FLIS aggregator pages. Our data gathering
infrastructure (Section III-A) already demonstrated a real-
world utilization of our classifier where we deployed it to
identify unknown FLIS pages. As an application, our classifier
can readily be used by human analysts to find unknown FLIS
websites that can then be analyzed for potential abuses.
We now describe the architecture of the FLIS classifier by
providing details on feature extraction, implementation strate-
gies, and a performance evaluation on the gathered dataset.
A. Feature Extraction
When extracting features for the FLIS classifier, we set the
following requirements: (1) features should target the look and
feel and modus operandi of the FLIS aggregator pages (for
accurate classification), and (2) the feature extraction process
should be efficient in terms of processing overhead. To this
end, we focus on extracting information from various live sport
streaming indicators, network traffic, specific widgets, and
from the images found on a webpage. Specifically, we extract
five HTML features, three network traffic features, two frame
features, and two image features. To extract these features,
we crawl a webpage using a crawler based on Selenium,
a testing framework for web applications, while storing the
HTML of every loaded <frame> and <iframe> element,
collecting all images in the page, logging network traffic, and
taking a screenshot of the webpage. For each crawled page,
the extracted features are incorporated in a feature vector. In
the following paragraphs, we provide details on the features
and our intuition for choosing them.
HTML features. This set of features is obtained by in-
terpreting the HTML code of every loaded <frame> and
<iframe> in a webpage. As such, this set models informa-
tion from the look and feel of the aggregator pages.
 Element text-to-global text ratio. Typically, the main
body of an aggregator page does not contain much text.
The majority of text found on these pages resides in specific
HTML elements, such as links and meta elements i.e., <a>,
<description>, <title>, <keywords>. To exploit
this trait, we use the Python goose-extractor module [4] to
extract the text from link elements, meta elements, and the
main body. We then measure the ratio of text that is located
within the link and meta elements to the global amount of text
found on the page. We use this ratio as a numeric feature.
 Number of indicative words in URLs. Aggregator pages
usually contain text in <a> elements and indexed URLs of
live streams, which generally represents numerous sports, TV
channels, and events between different countries or sports
clubs (e.g., /watch/baseball/foxsports.html). To
use this specific characteristic as a set of features, we compiled
four comprehensive word lists that contain several hundred
entries of different sports, countries, sports clubs, and sports
TV channels. We then use these lists to search for indicative
words in the visible text of <a> elements, and in normalized
text extracted from the URLs. We use a token extraction tech-
nique from [18] to extract the normalized text from URLs. For
example, /watch/baseball/foxsports.html would
be split into the tokens watch, baseball, foxsports,
and html. Finally, we count the occurrences of the indicative
words for each of the four categories on a webpage and include
the count values as a set of numeric features.
 n-grams. In addition to indicative words, we also measure
the presence of FLIS representative word sequences (n-grams)
in a webpage. The intuition is that n-grams which appear much
more frequently in aggregator pages than in non-FLIS ones are
a good marker for FLIS aggregator pages (e.g., “watch free
live football streams” etc.). To this end, we extract n-grams
that vary from length n = 1 to n = 5 from the meta elements,
the visible text of <a> elements, and from any text found on
the main body of the known aggregator pages. Afterwards, we
select the top 1,000 n-grams by measuring their importance
in the known FLIS aggregator and non-FLIS pages using TF-
IDF [42]. Lastly, we measure the frequency of the selected
n-grams on a webpage and incorporate these frequencies as a
set of numeric features.
 Presence of indicative widgets. We also inspect the pres-
ence of FLIS indicative widgets on a webpage. These widgets
are stand-alone applications from particular third-parties which
are embedded into the aggregator webpage. Specifically, we
found that a certain type of aggregator webpages often contain
specific stream (like http://ifirstrow.eu/webmaster/ etc.), chat,
and clock widgets. Hence, presence of these widgets on a page
is a good indicator of the FLIS aggregator page. Therefore,
we compiled a list of indicative widgets’ URLs from the
known aggregator pages. We then use these lists to identify the
presence of FLIS indicative widgets in a page and incorporate
this knowledge as a set of boolean features.
 Presence of reporting link. Aggregator domains typically
host a notice page for reporting of illegal streams indexed on
their websites. We observe that the visible text in the link
(<a> element) of these notice pages usually has keywords
such as “dmca”, “noticetakedown”, “notice”, “report” etc. We
use these characteristics and compile a list of notice keywords
from the known aggregator pages. Afterwards, we use this list
to identify the presence of notice keywords in the visible text
of <a> elements of a webpage and use it as a boolean feature.
Network traffic features. This set of features is extracted
from the network trace that is recorded while crawling a page.
By its very nature, this set models information from the modus
operandi of the FLIS aggregator pages.
 Third-party request ratio. This feature deals with the third-
party content on the aggregator webpage. Aggregator pages
often include HTML content from third-party services, such
as the use of frames provided by channel providers, the overlay
ads etc. To incorporate this information as a numeric feature,
we measure the ratio of HTTP requests to third-parties (other
domains) compared to the total amount of the HTTP requests.
 Presence of media traffic. We observe that it is also
common for aggregator webpages to have a Flash player
embedded on the page along with the indexed streaming
links (as shown in Figure 6). The player broadcasts live sport
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streams using a specific media protocol (e.g., RTMP etc.). To
capture this fact, we use the protocol signatures (described in
Section III-B) to detect the presence of the media traffic and
incorporate this information as a boolean feature.
 Non-standard port streaming. In connection with the pre-
vious feature, this feature indicates a presence of media-related
traffic on non-standard ports. The rationale for incorporating
this information, is that FLIS services often use non-standard
ports for transmitting media traffic using standard protocols
(e.g., RTMP on port 443 etc.). We expect that most non-FLIS
websites broadcast media traffic using the standard protocol
ports. Thus, we include a boolean feature that indicates the
use of a non-standard protocol port for broadcasting streams.
Frame features. This set of features is extracted by analyzing
all loaded <frame> and <iframe> elements on the aggre-
gator webpage, in an effort to further model the workings of
the FLIS aggregator pages.
 Number of frames. The usage of <iframe> elements
to index streaming links, embed video players, show ads etc.
is very common in FLIS services. Thus, we incorporate this
characteristic, as a set of numeric features, by counting the
number of <frame> and <iframe> elements found on a
page in combination with their child <frame> elements, in
a recursive fashion.
 Average and maximum nesting of frames. In addition to
the number of frames, we also include a set of numeric features
to measure the average and maximum level of nesting of any
given <iframe>. The rationale is that most of the aggregator
pages include deeply nested <iframe> elements to display
ads on videos or to embed third-party stream widgets. We
expect non-FLIS websites to have fewer nested <iframe>
elements than the FLIS aggregator webpages.
Image features. This set of features aims to model information
from images on the FLIS aggregator pages, focusing on the
look of FLIS aggregator webpages.
 Average and maximum image size. It is common for
aggregator pages to have several images of sports equipments,
flags, sports clubs, and TV channel logos. These images
are often placed alongside the indexed links of different TV
channels and sport streams. We observe that these images are
often small in size (on average 1.4 kilobytes) and account for
the majority of images on the aggregator webpages. Therefore,
we measure the average and maximum size of images found
on a webpage and incorporate these measurements as a set of
numeric features.
 Ratio of indicative images. As discussed earlier, aggregator
pages make heavy use of images that belong to sports equip-
ments, country flags, clubs, and TV channel logos. Thus, a
high ratio of these indicative images in comparison to all other
images on a webpage, is a good indicator of a FLIS aggregator
webpage. To measure the number of FLIS indicative images,
we first extracted all the images from the known aggregator
pages. Next, we clustered these images using a perceptual hash
function (PHash) (as described in Section IV-E). Afterwards,
we manually inspect the clusters and remove all the irrelevant
clusters (i.e., banners etc.). At this point, all remaining clusters
belong to the FLIS-indicative image categories (i.e., sports
equipments, country flags, TV channels and club logos). In
our approach, each cluster is expressed by a candidate PHash
value, which is representative of all images in it. Now, to
measure the ratio of FLIS indicative images, we extract all
the images from a page, compute their PHash values, and use
the Hamming distance as metric, between the candidate PHash
value of all the clusters and the PHash values of the extracted
images. If the distance between any of the extracted image’s
PHash and any candidate PHash value is less than 0.3, we label
the image as FLIS indicative. Finally, we measure the ratio of
the labeled FLIS indicative images to the other images found
on a page and incorporate this ratio as a numeric feature.
B. Evaluation
Implementation. To build the FLIS classifier, we opt for
a supervised learning approach. In this approach, we first
collected a set of labeled webpages, and we have used this set
to train the classifier by extracting the feature vectors. Once
the classifier is trained, a new page is crawled, translated into
the feature vector, and passed to the FLIS classifier. The FLIS
classifier then labels the page as a FLIS or non-FLIS page.
Specifically, for each new page, the classifier outputs a score.
If this score is greater than a selected threshold, the classifier
labels the page as a FLIS aggregator page.
The components of the FLIS classifier used to crawl a
website and extract the features are written in Python. To build
the FLIS classifier, we used the Random Forest algorithm [19]
implementation in Weka [27]. The rational of using the random
forest algorithm is that it is fast, robust with regards to outliers,
yields extremely accurate predictions, and can process a large
number of input features without overfitting. To foster future
research in FLIS services, we will be making the prototype
implementation of the FLIS classifier publicly available.
Evaluation datasets. To evaluate the performance of the
FLIS classifier, we assembled three different datasets that we
carefully examined and labeled. We now provide the details
on each of the datasets.
 Balanced dataset (BD): The balanced dataset consists of an
equal number of positive (FLIS aggregator pages) and negative
training samples (non-FLIS pages). We collected non-FLIS
pages by randomly crawling the links of Alexa top 1,000
domains and label each instance through manual inspection.
For aggregator pages, we extract the subset of webpages from
the gathered dataset and label each page through manual
inspection. Overall, this dataset consists of 3,500 aggregator
pages and 3,500 non-FLIS pages.
 Imbalanced dataset (ID): Besides the balanced dataset, we
also evaluate the performance of the FLIS classifier on an
imbalanced dataset. In reality, there are more non-FLIS web-
pages than FLIS aggregator pages. This unequal distribution
of webpages can bias the performance of classifier towards the
majority class (i.e., non-FLIS pages). To exhaustively evaluate
the discriminative nature of features and the classification
algorithm, we built a dataset with a class imbalance ratio of
10 to 1. Specifically, the imbalanced dataset contains 15,000
non-FLIS and 1,500 FLIS aggregator pages.
 Special testing dataset (STD): In both the balanced and im-
balanced datasets, the nature of the negative training samples
is substantially different from the positive samples. As such, an
evaluation on only these datasets will represent our classifier’s
ability to distinguish between FLIS webpages from entirely
different non-FLIS webpages (e.g., fb.com and bbc.com). To
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Figure 11: Zoomed ROC curves of the FLIS classifier on
balanced & imbalanced datasets.
this end, we assemble an additional special testing dataset
to evaluate our classifier’s ability of distinguishing between
common sports webpages and FLIS webpages. This dataset
contains 1,000 randomly crawled non-FLIS pages listed under
the “Sports” category of the open directory project [3].
Cross validation. To evaluate the detection accuracy of the
FLIS classifier, we perform a 10 fold cross-validation test on
both the balanced and imbalanced datasets. In the 10 fold
cross-validation test, the dataset is randomly divided into 10
smaller subsets, out of which 9 subsets are used for training
the classifier and 1 subset is used for testing (unseen pages
during training). This process is then repeated 10 times, with
each of the 10 subsets used exactly once as the testing data.
To avoid any artifacts, we repeat the process of 10 fold cross-
validation 10 times, each time the data is randomly divided
into 10 smaller subsets with a different seed value.
Figure 11 shows the ROC curves that we obtained on
averaged results of the tests for the balanced and imbalanced
dataset. In order to emphasize the FLIS classifier performance
at low false positives, we plot the zoomed-in ROC where the
false positive rates range from 0% to 3%. The tables shown in
Figure 11 provide details of the area under the ROC (AUC)
and the trade-off between the true positive (TP) rate and false
positive (FP) rate for a few preferred operating points on the
balanced and imbalanced ROC curves. The 99.9% area under
the curve (AUC) for both datasets, shows that our classifier
can properly handle both balanced and imbalanced datasets.
Moreover, we can see that for both datasets, when we select
a threshold value to achieve a false positive rate of 0%, the
classifier still yields a true positive rate of approximately
99.2%. These results indicate the accuracy of our classifier
when distinguishing the FLIS webpages from entirely different
non-FLIS webpages.
STD experiment. For this experiment, we first train a model
on 15,000 non-FLIS pages (from ID) and 3,500 FLIS pages
(from BD). The trained model is then used to classify the
special testing dataset (STD). Out of the 1,000 non-FLIS
sports pages in STD, the FLIS classifier misclassified only
3 pages as FLIS aggregator webpages (false positive rate =
0.3%) demonstrating the accuracy of the FLIS classifier when
dealing with the non-FLIS sports webpages.
Run-time performance. In addition to classification results,
we also measured the run-time performance of the FLIS
classifier. Running as a single threaded application on a 64-
bit 2.8 GHz Intel Core i5 CPU, our classifier takes 18.4
seconds on average to classify a given webpage, the slowest
being 75 seconds. The most expensive processes are extracting
the features from the HTML sources and network trace.
These processes are IO bound and account for the majority
of the runtime. Overall, in our data gathering process (as
demonstrated in Section III-A), we observed that the FLIS
classifier scales well in an online process.
Classifier evasion. The presented FLIS classifier is built on
attributes targeting the look and modus operandi of aggregator
pages. Therefore, an aggregator’s attempt to purposefully
evade detection is not an easy task. While an adversary can
evade a few specific features used in the learning process, this
is likely going to result in either increased operating costs,
or a loss of a percentage of their viewers. For instance, if
aggregators stop using text and images related with sports and
legitimate broadcast channels, they are likely to attract less
users to click on their links and interact with their malicious
ads. Overall, we argue that our FLIS classifier provides robust
detection of aggregator pages, which could be used both by
law enforcement as part of a take-down process, as well as by
users who may confuse an aggregator page for a legitimate
service provided by a reputable channel.
VI. RELATED WORK
There is a significant amount of prior work on the piracy
of live broadcasts from a legal perspective. Specifically, the
focus of this research is on highlighting copyright law [28],
[33], [36], [50], analyzing the consequences of piracy on
related organizations [16], [24], [47], and issuing proposals to
improve judicial conducts [28]. In contrast to these studies, we
map the FLIS ecosystem through real-world experiments and
empirically quantify the threats for both users landing on FLIS
domains, as well as for related companies whose copyrights
and trademarks are potentially abused by FLIS services.
Other research has focused on analyzing malicious adver-
tisement in the context of online fraud [26], [32], [46], and
how certain Internet services have been abused for monetary
gain [20], [34], [51], [52]. Studies that specifically target
deceptive advertisement techniques mainly focus on examining
the security implications of deceptive ad banners [23], [37].
Our work differs from these studies in that it focuses on the
interactions of users with the, practically unexplored, video
overlay ads and the numerous threats associated with it.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented the results of the first empirical
study of free live streaming services. We developed an infras-
tructure that enabled us to map the ecosystem of FLIS services,
identify the parties that facilitate anonymous broadcast of live
streams, and analyze the deceptive advertising content that
users are exposed to when they watch live broadcasts on FLIS
websites. In this process, we discovered various types of abuse
including malware distribution, malicious browser extensions,
substandard overlay advertising, and scams that could cost
users their personal information as well as financial loss.
Given the extent of the observed abuse and the large
number of copyright complaints, we engineered a classifier
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that can be used to, among others, alert users that they are
currently interacting with potentially dangerous FLIS page,
or help analysts find unknown FLIS pages in an effort to
curb copyright infringements. We employed the proposed
classifier in an online process to find new aggregator pages,
and showed that our classifier achieves high accuracy with low
false positives.
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